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OPINION OF THE COURT 
   
 
AMBRO, Circuit Judge  
 
 When a debtor sells its business in bankruptcy, it 
negotiates what assets and liabilities are transferred to the 
buyer, including contracts with continuing debtor obligations.  
The terms of the sale (often negotiated quickly)—embodying 
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what is sold and what is left behind—are not always clear, 
creating confusion and disputes.  We have such a case here, in 
essence one of contract interpretation.   
 
A group of investors (the “Investors”) provided funding 
to The Weinstein Company and its affiliates (“TWC” or the 
“Debtors”) in exchange for a share of future profits in certain 
movies (the “Films”).  When TWC declared bankruptcy, it sold 
substantially all its assets to Spyglass Media Group, LLC (also 
known as Lantern Entertainment LLC) under § 363 of the 
Bankruptcy Code, which they documented in an Asset 
Purchase Agreement (the “APA”).1   
 
The Investors argue that, under the APA, Spyglass 
bought the Investment Agreements and assumed the associated 
obligations, but Spyglass disagrees.  Although the Investors 
present creative and plausible arguments, we affirm the District 
Court’s affirmance of the Bankruptcy Court’s decision and 
hold that, under the APA, the Investment Agreements are not 
“Purchased Assets” and the associated obligations are not 
“Assumed Liabilities.” 
 
1 The Bankruptcy Code allows the debtor, after notice and a 
hearing, to sell its property “free and clear of any interest in 
such property,” subject to certain conditions and applicable 
non-bankruptcy law. 11 U.S.C. § 363(f).  This means that 
successor liability is often extinguished in a 363 sale.  See In 
re Trans World Airlines, Inc., 322 F.3d 283, 285 (3d Cir. 
2003).  However, buyers can and typically do assume liabilities 




  The Investors provided funding to the Debtors through 
twelve sets of Investment Agreements, each relating to a 
different Film.  In exchange for their upfront contribution, the 
Investors were to receive a share of the Films’ profits (if any 
existed), though they did not own any intellectual property in 
them.2  Further, the Investors agreed that the Investment 
Agreements are not executory contracts under the Bankruptcy 
Code, as they already funded each investment and do not have 
remaining material obligations under those Agreements.  
Investors’ Br. at 16; see In re Exide Techs., 607 F.3d 957, 962 
(3d Cir. 2010).3    
 
2 Many of the Investment Agreements provided for the Investor 
to have a lien on the Film’s profits to secure TWC’s 
obligations.  However, the security interests apparently were 
not deemed meaningful, for no financing statements were filed 
to perfect the liens (perhaps because the purported collateral 
comprised of speculative streams of payments).  See Oral Arg. 
Tr. 4:7–14.   
3 Whether a contract is “executory” has significant 
implications for its treatment under the Bankruptcy Code, the 
main one being that a debtor has the right to assume (i.e., 
continue) or reject (i.e., breach) an executory contract with 
court approval.  See 11 U.S.C. § 365(a).  As background, our 
Circuit has adopted the definition of an executory contract 
proposed by Professor Vern Countryman—“[A] contract under 
which the obligation of both the bankrupt and the other party 
to the contract are so far [unperformed] that the failure of either 
to complete performance would constitute a material breach 
excusing the performance of the other.”  Exide, 607 F.3d at 962 




 On March 19, 2018, following many sexual misconduct 
allegations against TWC’s co-founder Harvey Weinstein, 
TWC sought bankruptcy protection to facilitate the sale of its 
assets to Spyglass.  That same day, TWC and Spyglass signed 
the APA, which was later amended twice with input from 
creditors.  The sale closed in July 2018 and Spyglass paid $287 
million. 
 
One important function of the APA was to specify the 
assets Spyglass would purchase and the liabilities it would take 
over from TWC.  “Purchased Assets,” as its name suggests, are 
part of the sale, while “Excluded Assets” obviously are not.  
App. 843–44, APA §§ 2.1, 2.2.  Spyglass also took the bitter 
with the sweet and agreed to assume all liabilities associated 
with the Purchased Assets.  App. 844, APA § 2.3.  They are 
defined broadly and can include some “Contracts,” which the 
APA states are “any written contract, lease, license, agreement, 
arrangement, understanding, commitment, instrument, 
guarantee, undertaking, bid or proposal.”  App. 897, APA Ex. 
A-4.  The main category of Contracts within Purchased Assets 
are “Assumed Contracts,” which are those Contracts that 
Spyglass designates in writing it wants to buy and assume, 
though the parties dispute just which Contracts can be 
Assumed Contracts.  App. 917, APA Sch. 2.1(e).  Subject to 
certain conditions, Spyglass was given until November 2018, 
almost four months after the sale’s closing in July 2018, to 
designate or remove Assumed Contracts.  App. 850, APA § 
2.8(i); App. 1084–85, 1087.    
 
This dispute stems in part from confusing notices about 
Assumed Contracts filed by the Debtors and Spyglass.  In May 
2018, the Debtors filed a Final List of Potentially Assumed 
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Contracts and Leases (“the Assumed Contracts Schedule”) that 
purported to identify the “Assumed Contracts . . . subject to 
assumption and assignment.”  App. 668–69.  That Schedule 
listed all the Investment Agreements, but with a disclaimer that 
“the presence of an Assumed Contract and Lease listed on 
Exhibit 1 attached hereto does not constitute an admission that 
such Assumed Contract and Lease is an executory contract or 
unexpired lease.”  App. 669.   
 
The Debtors later tried to remove the Investment 
Agreements from the Assumed Contracts Schedule but did not 
do so clearly.  In the June 2018 Contract Notice, they listed 
eight of the Investment Agreements on a schedule that 
“identifies certain non-executory contracts that are being 
removed from the Assumed Contracts Schedule.”  App. 10, 
678.  Following the sale closing in July, Spyglass filed the 
November 2018 Contract Notice, which listed nine Investment 
Agreements as “Excluded Contracts,” therefore not Assumed 
Contracts.  App. 11, 847, 1483, 1558.  The effect of these 
confusing contract notices is disputed, but the key takeaway is 
that not all the Investment Agreements were removed from the 
Assumed Contracts Schedule.  See Spyglass Br. at 17 
(conceding that one Investment Agreement remained on the 
list of contracts to be assumed).   
 
The Investors were essentially quiet until January 2019, 
when they sent a letter to Spyglass requesting payments (i.e., 
their asserted share of a Film’s profits) due under one of the 
Investment Agreements.  Spyglass refused.  In response, the 
Investors filed a motion in the Bankruptcy Court seeking a 
judgment that Spyglass bought all the Investment Agreements 
under the APA.  The Bankruptcy Court denied the motion, and 





 We look anew at the District and Bankruptcy Courts’ 
conclusions of law.  In re Goody’s Family Clothing Inc., 610 
F.3d 812, 816 (3d Cir. 2010) (citation omitted).  Our task here 
is to interpret the APA, which by its terms is governed by 
federal bankruptcy and Delaware law.  App. 880, APA § 
13.6(a).  Where a contract is unambiguous, we interpret it as a 
matter of law.  See Wayne Land & Mineral Grp. LLC v. 
Delaware River Basin Comm’n, 894 F.3d 509, 528 (3d Cir. 
2018).   
III. 
This case reduces to a single question:  Did Spyglass 
assume TWC’s obligations under the Investment Agreements?  
We first address the Investors’ primary argument that the 
Investment Agreements are Assumed Contracts and thus 
Purchased Assets whose obligations were assumed by 
Spyglass. 
 
 The parties agree that the Investment Agreements are 
Contracts but disagree if they are Assumed Contracts.  In turgid 
legalese meant to be precise but hardly simple, section 2.8(a) 
of the APA provides as follows (with explanatory annotations):  
 
[First sentence] Section 2.8(a) of the Disclosure 
Schedule sets forth a list of all executory Contracts 
relating to the Business or the Purchased Assets to 
which one or more of Seller Parties [TWC] are party 
(the “Available Contracts”) . . . and which may be 
updated from time to time after the Execution Date by 
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the Seller Parties to add any Contracts not included on 
such schedule as of the Execution Date. [Second 
sentence omitted] . . . [Third sentence] Prior to the 
Closing Date, Buyer [Spyglass], in its sole discretion by 
written notice to the Seller Parties, shall designate in 
writing which Available Contracts . . . relating to the 
Business or the Purchased Assets that Buyer wishes to 
“assume” (the “Assumed Contracts”) and subject to the 
right of Buyer, at any time prior to the Closing Date, 
Buyer may, in its sole discretion, determine not to 
“assume” any Available Contracts previously 
designated as an Assumed Contract.  [Fourth sentence] 
All executory Contracts of the Seller Parties that are 
listed on Section 2.8(a) of the Disclosure Schedule as of 
the Closing Date and which Buyer does not designate in 
writing for assumption shall not be considered Assumed 
Contracts or Purchased Assets and shall automatically 
be deemed “Excluded Contracts” (and for the avoidance 
of doubt, Buyer shall not be responsible for any related 
Cure Amounts related to any Excluded Contracts).  
 
App. 847 (emphasis and explanatory notes added).  The 
Second Amendment to the APA, executed in July 2018 before 
the sale closed that month, added the word “executory” 
(italicized above) in the fourth sentence.  App. 949, 1083.   
  
We conclude that, based on the APA and bankruptcy 
law, the Investment Agreements are not Assumed Contracts.  
First, section 2.8 limits Assumed Contracts to executory 
Contracts, but the Investment Agreements are, without dispute, 
not executory.  Assumed Contracts can only be selected from 
the list of Available Contracts, which is “a list of all executory 
Contracts.” App. 847, APA § 2.8(a) (emphasis added).  The 
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Investors rejoin that because the second clause of the first 
sentence in section 2.8(a) says that “any Contracts” can be 
added to the list, that means non-executory Contracts can be 
Available Contracts and thus can be designated as Assumed 
Contracts subject to sale.   
 
We reject that reading.  The term “Available Contracts,” 
which lists those Contracts that can be designated for 
assumption by Spyglass, is limited to executory Contracts (the 
first clause of the first sentence in section 2.8(a)).  Further, the 
references to cure amounts elsewhere in the section make sense 
only for executory contracts.  See 11 U.S.C. § 365(b)(1)(A) 
(discussing “cure” obligations in the context of executory 
contracts).   
 
 Second, the word “assume” is a term of art in 
bankruptcy that applies only to executory contracts.  See 11 
U.S.C. § 365(a); In re Columbia Gas Sys. Inc., 50 F.3d 233, 
239 (3d Cir. 1995) (“In cases where the nonbankrupt party has 
fully performed [that is, a non-executory contract], it makes no 
sense to talk about assumption or rejection.”); In re Exide 
Techs., 378 B.R. 762, 765 (Bankr. D. Del. 2007) (“Section 365 
allows debtors to assume or reject an executory contract[] but 
provides no such option for a non-executory contract.”).  Here, 
the APA is to be “construed in accordance with federal 
bankruptcy law.”  App. 880, APA § 13.6(a).  The Investors do 
not offer any persuasive arguments that the APA deviated from 
the Bankruptcy Code.  Read as a whole, the APA is not 
ambiguous—an Assumed Contract must be an Available 
Contract and an Available Contract must be an executory 




 Third, because a non-executory Contract cannot be an 
Assumed Contract, it does not matter if it appeared on the 
Assumed Contracts Schedule.  We acknowledge that the 
Debtors and Spyglass did not clearly remove all the Investment 
Agreements from the Assumed Contracts Schedule, and 
despite two attempts to do so in the June and November 2018 
Contract Notices, at least one Investment Agreement still 
remained on that Schedule.  Spyglass Br. at 17.  But for 
Spyglass this mistake is not fatal to its case that none of the 
Investment Agreements were Assumed Contracts, as it only 
failed to remove what should not have been there in the first 
place.4  Thus we do not reach any of the Investors’ arguments 
about whether Spyglass properly removed any of the 
Investment Agreements from the Assumed Contracts 
Schedule, including whether it could do so after the sale 
closing.   
 
 Fourth, we also reject the Investors’ judicial estoppel 
argument.  The Investors point by analogy to the treatment of 
the Cohen Agreement, a work-made-for-hire contract between 
TWC and a producer (though not an Investment Agreement), 
as evidence that a non-executory Contract can still be an 
Assumed Contract.  Specifically, they note that the Cohen 
Agreement was listed on the Assumed Contracts Schedule, 
later listed in the June 2018 Contract Notice as a non-executory 
Contract, then ultimately purchased pursuant to § 363 of the 
 
4 None of this is meant to reward oversights in drafting the 
contract notices.  However, because tens of thousands of 
contracts were at issue in this case, we are sympathetic to the 
reality that mistakes are inevitable.  App. 2293, Bankr. Hr’g 
Tr. 58 (acknowledging that there was “confusion because the 
original list . . . may have included non-executory contracts”). 
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Bankruptcy Code.  The Investors insist that what is good for 
the goose must be good for the gander, so if Spyglass bought 
the Cohen Agreement, a non-executory Contract, by listing it 
on the Assumed Contracts Schedule, then that Schedule can be 
used to purchase the Investment Agreements too.   
 
But this argument omits a critical fact—Spyglass 
indicated in the November 2018 Contract Notice that it 
believed it had already purchased the Cohen Agreement.  App. 
1484 n.3 (“The Purchaser [Spyglass] filed a declaratory action 
against one talent counterparty, Bruce Cohen, on October 17, 
2018, seeking a determination that the contract between Cohen 
and The Weinstein Company is not executory and therefore 
was already assigned to the Purchaser pursuant to Bankruptcy 
Code section 363 [to repeat, the Code’s sale section].”); see 
also App. 2295, Bankr. Hr’g Tr. 60 (noting that the Investment 
Agreements “are distinguishable from the Cohen contract[] . . 
. because the buyer designated the Cohen contract[] as one[] 
that the buyer bought under 363”).  Here, Spyglass never 
indicated it wished to purchase the Investment Agreements 
under § 363.  The only glimmer of that intent is the Assumed 
Contracts Schedule, a document filed early in the sale process 
that was over 2,000 pages long and listed tens of thousands of 
Contracts under a glaring disclaimer that the presence of any 
Contract on that list is not an admission it is executory.  That 
Schedule is not enough for us to override the otherwise lucid 
language in the APA.  Put differently, mistakenly listing non-
executory Contracts on a behemoth schedule meant to include 
only executory Contracts hardly suffices as explicit intent to 
purchase them.  And to be clear, it is possible for Spyglass to 
purchase a non-executory Contract as part of the § 363 sale, as 
it purported to do for the Cohen Agreement.  But that purchase 
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is not accomplished by relying on “Assumed Contracts,” a 
term limited to executory Contracts.     
 
 Having concluded the Investment Agreements are not 
Assumed Contracts, we turn next to the definition of 
“Excluded Liabilities” (i.e., liabilities retained by TWC and not 
transferred to Spyglass), which includes “all liabilities arising 
under any Contract that is not an Assumed Contract.”  App. 
845, APA § 2.4(f).  This describes the Investment Agreements.  
Thus Spyglass did not assume any obligations under the 
Investment Agreements and is not required to turn over any of 
the Films’ profits to the Investors.5  
 
This result is not an accident but a feature of bankruptcy 
law.  Where the nonbankrupt party has performed a contract 
but the debtor has not (in other words, the contract is not 
executory because there is no material obligation to be 
 
5 We do not need to resolve whether the Investment 
Agreements are also “Excluded Liabilities” because they are 
debt instruments.  App. 500, APA § 2.4(c).  Still, we think the 
District Court likely erred when it concluded the Investment 
Agreements are debt instruments.  The Investors’ right to 
payment is tied solely to the Films’ performance, and they 
recover nothing if the Films do not generate profit.  Indeed, 
many of the Autostyle factors our Circuit previously used to aid 
in the analysis weigh against the conclusion these Investment 
Agreements are debt instruments.  See In re HH Liquidation, 
LLC, 590 B.R. 211, 292–96 (Bankr. D. Del. 2018); see also In 
re Autostyle Plastics, Inc., 269 F.3d 726, 749–50 (6th Cir. 
2001).  For instance, the agreements are called “Investment 
Agreements” rather than loan or note agreements, most lack a 
fixed maturity date, and none has a set rate of interest.   
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performed by the non-debtor), “the estate could receive no 
benefit from” assuming the contract, so “it seems appropriate 
to simply bar the trustee from ever assuming such a contract.”  
3 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 365.02[2](a) (16th ed. 2020).  In 
effect, the Bankruptcy Code views these non-executory 
contracts as liabilities for the debtor, unlike executory contracts 
whose value is uncertain and must be afforded the flexible 
assumption and rejection process set out in § 365.  Of course, 
buyers can still voluntarily assume liabilities, including (as 
noted above) buying non-executory contracts as part of a § 363 
sale, but they must clearly agree to do so.  Here, we have no 
evidence of that clear agreement, nor do the Investors present 
any evidence that the assumption of these liabilities was ever 
negotiated with the Debtors or Spyglass.  The Investors’ 
arguments fail because the Bankruptcy Code anticipates that 
Spyglass would typically not want to buy these Investment 
Agreements and, indeed, nothing indicates otherwise.  
 
IV. 
 The Investors raise additional arguments, but they are 
based on less plausible readings of the APA.  
 
 The Investors’ first alternative argument is that the 
Investment Agreements are Purchased Assets because they are 
“Title Rights,” which include “other contract rights with 
respect to each Covered Title.”  App. 917, APA Sch. 2.1(b); 
App. 1008, APA Ex. A-13.  All the Films are Covered Titles, 
so the Investors assert that the Investment Agreements are Title 
Rights.  This catch-all term, however, was meant to address 
valuable intellectual property and other rights in TWC’s 
movies to ensure that Spyglass received the benefit of its 
bargain.  By contrast, the Investment Agreements do not 
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contain any valuable rights in the Films.  Ancillary contract 
rights in the Investment Agreements such as indemnification 
and confidentiality are about the contractual arrangement and 
not rights “with respect to” the Films.  The only provision 
remotely approaching a Title Right is the Investors’ 
opportunity to provide guidance regarding production, 
distribution, and marketing of the Films.  But this is hardly a 
“right” for TWC, especially given all the Films were released 
years ago.  The Investors did not retain any intellectual 
property in the Films, so they are stuck with the bargain they 
struck. 
  
 Second, we also reject the Investors’ back-door 
argument that the Investment Agreements were purchased by 
Spyglass because they are not “Excluded Assets.”  As 
amended, the definition of Excluded Assets captures “all 
executory Contracts that are not Assumed Contracts.”  App. 
844, APA § 2.2; App. 919, APA Sch. 2.2(h).  The term 
“executory” was added in the Second Amendment.  App. 1021.  
The Investors argue that assets under the APA are either 
“Purchased” or “Excluded,” so if they are not Excluded, they 
must be Purchased.  No doubt this provision is not the model 
of clarity, for the definition of “Excluded Assets” is silent on 
how to classify non-executory Contracts.  But we do not need 
to adopt the Investors’ reading.  For one thing, the definition of 
“Excluded Liability,” as noted above, states that Spyglass did 
not assume liabilities under Contracts that are not Assumed 
Contracts.  That express provision supersedes the silent one.  
App. 844, APA § 2.4 (“Notwithstanding any provision in this 
Agreement or any other writing to the contrary, . . . Buyer is 
assuming only the Assumed Liabilities and is not assuming any 
other Liability of any Seller Party of whatever nature.”) 
(emphasis added); cf. Gerber v. Enter. Prods. Holdings, LLC, 
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67 A.3d 400, 419 (Del. 2013), overruled on other grounds by 
Winshall v. Viacom Int’l, Inc., 76 A.3d 808 (Del. 2013).  
Further, the Investors’ argument defies logic.  Under their 
view, Spyglass agreed in the APA, by default, to buy every 
non-executory Contract and assume their post-closing 
obligations.  The APA and common sense do not require us to 
go so far.  
 
 Finally, the Investors argue that because the Films are 
Purchased Assets, and Spyglass assumed all liabilities “arising 
out of the operation of the Purchased Assets,” App. 844, APA 
§ 2.3, it also assumed obligations under the Investment 
Agreements.  This argument fails because the Investment 
Agreements only provided funding for the Films and did not 
affect their operation, as the Investors had no hand in making 
or releasing the Films. 
 
*    *    *    *    * 
 Ultimately, the Investors’ arguments amount to a 
“gotcha”—that Spyglass accidentally purchased the 
Investment Agreements due to a foot fault.6  For us to conclude 
that it agreed to assume significant liabilities under non-
executory contracts with no obvious benefit, we need clear 
language in the APA or an unambiguous indication of 
Spyglass’s intent to do so.  We have neither here, so we affirm 
 
6 Tellingly, the Investors did not try to clarify whether Spyglass 
bought the Investment Agreements until January 2019, nearly 
six months after the sale closed and two months after the 
November 2018 Contract Notice was filed.  Oral Arg. Tr. 
10:14–11:7.    
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the District Court’s order affirming the Bankruptcy Court’s 
ruling.   
